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Abstract
Trade liberalization is famously known for both creating winners and losers
via processes of dislocation, sectoral reallocation, and specialization. This
paper studies the conditions under which excess “losers” are generated during
the process of liberalization with a focus on the role of institutions in economic
transition. I contend that poor institutions, in particular property rights and
democracy, can create unnecessary hardship in the transition to greater open-
ness, generating a much higher burden on compensatory policies and making
it more difficult to sustain open trade policies. Using a new dataset of trade
openness, economic inequality, and institutions, and using 3SLS estimation to
account for endogeneity, the analysis finds that this is indeed the case: high
property rights and more democracy appear to help to mitigate trade-related
inequality. Moreover, poor institutions create a downward spiral, with greater
inequality leading to lower trade openness. These results imply that basic insti-
tutions can help to minimize losses sparked by globalization, while other well-
meaning policies can actually increase disruptions.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Trade as a percentage of GDP has increased substantially
in both low- and high-income countries since 1990, level-
ling off somewhat after the global financial crisis but still
approximately 2.5 times what it was in the early 1970s
(Figure 1). Accompanying this increase in trade (but not
necessarily driven by it, see Ravallion (2018)) has been an
increase in within-country inequality, also shown in
Figure 1, a result which might be predicted by economic
theory (Burtless, 1995): in particular, it is well-known
that the process of trade liberalization creates “winners”
and “losers,” as the forces which are responsible for the
gains of trade - increased competition, reallocation of
capital and labour, shifts according to comparative
advantage—are precisely those which can cause
dislocation and hardship for segments of the population.
Governments have attempted to balance the dispersed
gains and concentrated losses of trade liberalization
through various strategies, devising schemes to compen-
sate the “losers” via policies funded by the “winners,”
with the goal of creating a pro-trade consensus (the so-
called “embedded liberalism” thesis, see Hays, Ehrlich,
and Peinhardt (2005)). Unfortunately, it is entirely possi-
ble that compensatory policies may be less effective in
convincing the populace of trade's value if the number of
losers reaches a substantial portion of the population or
some critical mass (Morrissey, 1995). In this vein, it may
be doubly difficult for compensatory policies to hold
together a pro-trade coalition if the country's economic
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structure itself is contributing to the generation of
“losers,” creating a pool of losers from trade larger than it
needs to be. In other words, if distortions present in an
economy generate an artificially large number of losers
compared to an economy absent such distortions, fiscal
policies could be strained or, in the worst case, unable to
cope with the compensation process. Moreover, an econ-
omy that generates too many losers from trade will find
itself under constant political pressure to reverse its liber-
alization, and it is likely even more distortions will be
introduced into the country's institutional system, leading
to worse economic outcomes.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the condi-
tions under which extra “losers” are generated during the
process of liberalization through an examination of the
role of institutions in economic transition. The hypothe-
sis of the research is that poor institutions, especially eco-
nomic ones, can create unnecessary hardship in the
transition to greater openness. Indeed, if economic insti-
tutions are dysfunctional in some way, they are then
likely to hinder the mobility necessary to emerge from
trade-induced dislocation, generating inequalities via
institutional hysteresis. Primus inter pares among these
institutions would be property rights, which protect the
ability of owners of factors of production to dispose of
these factors as they see fit; with poor property rights,
transfer incentives are weakened, and the gains of liberal-
ization may pass by unrealized.
The consequence of poor property rights would not
be limited to static effects of increasing the number of
“losers” from globalization, however, but would also
have a dynamic effect of decreasing trade liberalization
in the long run. A higher-than-anticipated number of
losers from globalization would generate a much higher
burden on compensatory policies, making weaker gov-
ernments unable to maintain transfers necessary for a
pro-trade coalition. In such a situation, excess losses from
globalization will make further trade liberalization less
likely in the future.
This paper is the first attempt in the literature to link
institutions and losers from globalization in an explicit
manner. If good institutions can increase trade, and if
trade influences institutions, and if trade may create
inequality, then how do pre-existing “good” institutions
influence trade-generated inequality? Would “good”
institutions decrease the number of losers and thus
increase political support for continued trade liberaliza-
tion? Or are institutions merely exerting their effects via
the trade channel?
The results of the analysis below confirm that poor
institutions create a missing link between trade openness
(and opening) and the generation of “losers,” especially
in the realm of income inequality. Using three-stage least
squares (3SLS) techniques on a new dataset of trade,
inequality, and institutions, the analysis shows that good
institutions, and in particular property rights, do indeed
mitigate losses from trade, lowering inequality in the
presence of trade liberalization. This effect is statistically
and economically significant and robust to a number of
sensitivity analyses. Clearly then, the converse is true:
bad institutions do create more losers from globalization
than are necessary.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next
section discusses the previous literature and focuses on
the oft-quoted but little-debated definition of “losers”
from globalization, using this derivation to set up the
FIGURE 1 Trade as a % of GDP in
the World and High/Low Income
Countries. Source: World Development
Indicators and Author's Calculations
from Solt (2016) [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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identification strategy. Section 3 builds on this previous
research to set up the empirical strategy, while Section 4
is devoted to a discussion of the results and sensitivity
analyses. Section 5 offers some concluding thoughts and
derives policy recommendations going forward.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW AND
THEORETICAL BASIS
2.1 | Who is a “loser?”
The consensus on trade generating “winners” and
“losers” often runs into a key obstacle in measuring this
effect, and that is precisely defining what makes a
“loser.” O'Brien and Leichenko (2003) call attention to
this fact, noting that the terms “winners” and “losers”
have both political and economic meanings, while the
perception of being a “loser” also may be influenced by
psychological traits beyond mere economic calculation
(Rubin (2002) notes that zero-sum intuition tends to per-
sist in the populace, meaning a tendency to assign “loss”
even when there may not be one). From a practical
standpoint, given how trade reforms are usually intro-
duced as part of a broad package of liberalization (Falvey,
Foster, & Greenaway, 2012), it is often difficult to disen-
tangle specific trade-related effects on certain segments of
a country's workforce. But even if one could entirely iso-
late the effects of (greater) trade opening on a national
economy, we are still left with little guidance on how to
clearly separate the losers from the winners.
The extant literature has coalesced around several
metrics to define “losers” in the fact of trade-related com-
petition, based mainly on class, income level, and/or
source of income. The most common definitions of loser
focus on the effects of trade across income distributions,
concentrating either on the very poor of a society
(Harrison, Rutherford, & Tarr, 2003) or on the relative sta-
tus of some countries in relation to others (Bouët, Mevel, &
Orden, 2007). The theory behind this supposed effect
encompasses several facets, including the fact that the
poorest segments of society are often located in the infor-
mal economy and thus are not poised to reap the gains
from globalization (or, alternately, are more exposed to
shocks). Another possible channel by which trade could
harm the poor involves threatening livelihoods, as poorer
workers are generally lower-skilled and unable to com-
pete in a more modern or advanced economy.
Ravallion (2006) also notes that trade may not explicitly
harm the poor but given that most of the gains of trade
are captured by the non-poor, income gaps may widen
and attenuate poverty. Finally, removal of trade taxes may
threaten government revenue, causing a cutback in state
aid to the poor (Bannister & Thugge, 2001). In each of
these scenarios, the poorest are assumed to be the natural
“losers” in any trade liberalization.
Despite the intuitive nature of these explanations, the
empirical evidence is less uniform on the effects of trade
on the poorest, meaning that we may not simply equate
“poor” with “losers from trade.” In one of the largest sur-
veys of globalization-related inequality, Milanovic (2013)
finds that the losers from globalization are those between
the 75th and the 90th percentile in income globally,
whose incomes grew much more slowly than other per-
centiles. Interestingly, however, Milanovic also shows
that the poorest 5% benefitted much more than those in
the 75th to 90th percentiles, meaning that the poorest
segments of society were actually aided rather than dev-
astated by trade. This effect has been echoed by several
other studies, which confirm that the poor are also
amongst those most advantaged by trade liberalization,
due to greater consumer choice and lower prices. Empiri-
cal evidence from Dollar and Kraay (2004) demonstrates
that, on average, there is a great diversity of winners and
losers amongst the poor and there is no systematic or
automatic loss among the poorest of society due to glob-
alization, a finding also confirmed by Ravallion (2006).
As Topalova (2010) also showed, other factors beyond
mere income levels, including institutional arrangements
and labour mobility, mattered much more in determining
losers in India's trade liberalization in the early 1990s.
This scenario means that a more precise definition of
losers must be sought. Rather than concentrating solely on
income levels, the trade literature has instead focused on
skill levels (which tend to be correlated with but that do
not exclusively overlap with income levels). Davidson and
Matusz (2006) are typical of this literature, identifying two
groups of losers from liberalization: “stayers” who are
stuck in the low-tech sector and “movers” who go through
costly training to switch from the low- to the high-tech sec-
tor. However, even here there are anomalies. Rudra (2005)
shows that effects of globalization on workers are condi-
tional on a country's level of development; in particular,
workers in high-income countries, while nominally lower-
skilled, may have greater bargaining power than low-
skilled workers in low-income countries. This theory is
supported by the famous work from Lawrence and Slaugh-
ter (1993), which found no effect of trade openness on
wage levels in the United States. Similarly, Manasse and
Turrini (2001) show that trade can actually be beneficial
for the lowest-skilled if trade can introduce skill-
complementary technology (instead of substitute technol-
ogy). Barraud and Calfat (2008) also show that sectoral
effects are less pronounced under trade liberalization, as
Argentina's globalization alleviated poverty most markedly
in the non-tradables sector.
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While the disruptions from trade may be necessarily
concentrated in manufacturing and lower-skilled indus-
tries due to the ease of movement of goods across borders
(and the relatively harder road to trade in services, due to
cultural, linguistic, and other “local knowledge” factors),
that does not mean that there may not be “losers” in
other socio-economic strata. Graham (2001) points out
that those who see themselves as losers are not necessar-
ily poor, but rather newly vulnerable members of the
middle class who perceive that gains from market
reforms have gone disproportionately to the top of the
income distribution. Kemp (2007) provides a long list of
psychological biases that people utilize when assessing
gains from trade, and loss aversion combined with erro-
neous perceptions of “fairness” (grounded in a misread-
ing of utility) figure high in this list, explaining why
those with more to lose might consider themselves
“losers” already from existing openness to trade. Simi-
larly, Kriesi et al. (2006) note that individuals who have a
strong sense of identity with their national community
are also likely to perceive themselves as losers under
globalization, due to the process of “de-nationalization”
which accompanies trade liberalization.
Given these various issues regarding the understand-
ing of who is a “loser” from globalization, perhaps the
simplest way to encompass all of the various facets of
economic loss is to look at the broader idea of within-
country income inequality (Bergh & Nilsson, 2010).
Using this as a rough proxy for overall trade-related
losses has many benefits: in the first instance, workers or
industries disadvantaged by globalization will fall behind
in wage earnings or profits, creating a widening gap with
those who have successfully taken advantage of globali-
zation. Looking at within-country inequality also may
mitigate issues discovered with cross-country analyses,
mainly that the development level of an economy matters
for determining the impact of trade. By using within-
country inequality, the country's benchmark is not
against an idealized representative worker, but rather
against the country's own income distribution histori-
cally. Moreover, as inequality is a relative setting, its use
as a metric for losers may also capture the alternative def-
initions mooted above, including economic insecurity
from the middle class. Finally, while there are numerous
sources of income inequality, many of these may be con-
trolled for in an econometric setting, leaving much of any
widening gap attributable directly to trade. In other
words, while we may not be able to observe all of the
channels in which trade may create losers, we can view
the output variable of income inequality after the fact; by
controlling for the other sources of inequality, the resid-
ual from this examination could thus plausibly be attrib-
uted to globalization.
2.2 | How do institutions affect the
number of losers?
Having chosen a broad metric to understand the “losers”
from globalization, the next step is to understand the the-
ory behind how institutions and trade could interact to
mitigate or exacerbate trade-related inequality. Recent
work seems to provide evidence for the fact that trade
openness ceteris paribus increases inequality, albeit not in
a linear fashion. In particular, Rojas-Vallejos and Tur-
novsky (2017) show how tariff reductions can increase
short-term inequality, while admitting that the increase in
demand and economic activity can offset such losses for
the poorest sectors of society in the longer run. In a similar
vein but introducing the issue of reverse causality, Katsimi
and Moutos (2010) also show a U-shaped relationship
between inequality and tariffs, with low levels of inequal-
ity associated with higher tariff rates which then decline
and eventually rebound; the highest levels of inequality
are then associated with the highest tariff rates. The
authors note that this is likely a form of redistribution, but
it is also plausible that high levels of protectionism are a
cause of inequality, rather than a response to it.
Given the reality that losers are indeed created by
globalization, this paper is fashioned around two separate
hypotheses, derived from the previous literature and
focused on the role of institutions in this relationship.
The first hypothesis is:
H1 Countries with poor institutions create more losers
from trade than those with good institutions.
As noted, a wealth of literature exists relating trade
and inequality but a comparatively smaller literature has
modelled either the effect of institutions on inequality or
the effects of trade on institutions (and vice versa). What
research does exist, however, shows a connection
between poor institutional quality and inequality globally
(Chong & Calderon, 2000; Chong & Gradstein, 2007;
Lin & Fu, 2016) while also accounting for the disruptive
nature of trade liberalization. Globalization can properly
be thought of as a process, a temporary event which can
reorient an economy's structure but with effects that are
often permanent. The challenge in adapting to this
longer-term structural disruption comes down to a coun-
try's incentive structure; with proper incentives, the dis-
ruption occasioned by globalization can become an
opportunity, allowing for resources to shift and adjust to
take advantage of the new competitive environment.
Where incentives are flawed or blocked in some way, the
adjustment is likely to take a much longer time (if at all),
leading to unnecessary deadweight losses across an
economy.
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Institutions enter into this theoretical relationship
due to the fact that they are creators, enforcers, and guar-
antors of various incentive structures in society. Writ
large, institutions can then be said to mediate returns to
factors of production precisely via the power they exert
on incentives, altering relative prices through informa-
tion dispersion or negatively via transaction costs or cul-
tural and organizational barriers. In fact, if an institution
does not perform well at guaranteeing a growth-friendly
incentive structure or if the institution is designed explic-
itly to create barriers (such as in rigid labour markets),
institutions can retard the gains from trade
(Kapstein, 2000). With the gains from trade vitiated, not
only do the costs from trade remain but they are often
increased, meaning that poorly-functioning institutions
not only reduce the number of winners but increase the
number of losers.
As already hinted at, “institutions” are not an amor-
phous lump and, in reality, are highly differentiated by
function and form (Hartwell, 2013). With regard to the
link between institutions and inequality in the presence
of globalization, the most prominent institutional mecha-
nism that has been surveyed is the labour market, includ-
ing employment protection legislation (EPL),
unionization, minimum wages, and the like. The theoret-
ical link between rigid labour market institutions and
inequality is ambiguous: on the one hand, minimum
wages and employment protection are meant to mitigate
against poverty, providing assistance for lower-skilled
professions, thus ensuring employment and lessen
income gaps. On the other hand, there is ample theoreti-
cal and empirical evidence that such institutions could
exacerbate inequality, with minimum wages and unions
advantaging insiders to the detriment of outsiders, and
EPL could reduce job turnover and labour mobility, trap-
ping individuals in lower-paying positions
(as Topalova (2010) notes in the case of India). Jaumotte
and Osorio Buitron (2015) provide evidence for both sides
of this coin, noting that eroding minimum wages can
lead to higher inequality, while large-scale collective
bargaining increases unemployment and thus inequality.
While labour market institutions are the most obvious
link to inequality outcomes, there is a strong case to be
made for other institutions having a powerful effect on
creating or mitigating losses in society. In particular,
property rights, embodied in contracting institutions and
the protection of the right of ownership, should theoreti-
cally have a mitigating influence on income inequality.
Chong and Gradstein (2007) lay out a straightforward
case for the relationship, noting that contract enforce-
ment, as embodied by an independent judiciary, allows
for the poor to extract rents as well as the rich. When
those rights are missing, rich and particularly powerful
elites may expropriate assets from the poor and/or refuse
the poor access to the economic system. Similarly, follow-
ing along the lines of de Soto's (2000) thesis, a lack of
property rights may mean that potential assets held by
the poor cannot be translated into tangible capital or col-
lateral; thus, income mobility is restricted, and inequality
widens. There is also a strong feedback effect from
inequality to property rights, meaning that inequality can
also decrease property rights as elites attempt to cling to
their spoils (Glaeser, Scheinkman, & Shleifer, 2003;
Sonin, 2003).
Finally, democratic institutions should also have an
impact on income inequality. Part of the way in which
democracy would impact inequality is through the choice
of labour market institutions, as noted above, but it may
also be reflected in fiscal policies, as polities could choose
to create programs targeted precisely at compensating the
losers (Perotti, 1996). Such an approach could quell social
tensions while also creating credible commitment for
continued redistribution in the future (Acemoglu &
Robinson, 2000), a fact which would track with the ongo-
ing process of globalization and perhaps mitigate its
effects. Empirical evidence for the effects of democracy
are mixed, with Simpson (1990), working before the great
wave of globalization of the 90s, who found that there
was also a U-shaped relationship between democracy
and inequality: higher levels of democracy corresponded
with low inequality, but medium levels of democracy
exacerbated it. Other studies, such as Rodrik (1998), show
a stronger and linear association between democracy and
lessened inequality, while other work advances the idea
that inequality may actually be lower in authoritarian
regimes (Gradstein & Milanovic, 2004). Turning to the
idea of democracy in the presence of economic openness,
however, Reuveny and Li (2003) clearly show that
democracy and economic openness both reduce income
inequality over a sample of 69 countries.1 This result is in
line with what is expected by theory and is also part of
this supposition.
H2 Countries with more losers from trade have slower
trade liberalization progress.
As noted above, the effects of poor institutions are not
static unfortunately, and can create a vicious cycle, where
increased inequality feeds back into institutional deterio-
ration (Savoia, Easaw, & McKay, 2010). If already-poor
institutions are allowed to decline further, it can be
expected that inequality in a country would also continue
to worsen (along with other economic indicators, as in
the case of Venezuela today), creating even more losers
(Gradstein, 2008). The pressure on institutions could
result in a prolonged underdevelopment trap alleviated
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only by radical institutional reform or economic crisis
(or, in many cases, both).
The first set of institutions likely to suffer from
increased inequality are political ones, such as democracy
or the rule of law. Chong and Gradstein (2007) demon-
strate empirically the feedback effects between institu-
tions and inequality and show that inequality is directly
tied to poorer-quality political institutions. Similarly,
Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz (2007) note that eco-
nomic inequality (as measured by Gini coefficients) pre-
dicts both the rule of law and democratic accountability,
with higher levels of inequality associated with a lower
rule of law. Seen from a political economy vantage point,
this result is not surprising, as one would assume that
high pre-existing levels of inequality would persist mainly
due to political barriers to entry. To express it another
way, inequality remains or even widens due to increasing
restrictions placed on the political system, with insiders
colluding to keep outsides on the outside. In this manner,
already-poor institutions are frozen in place or deterio-
rate in a way that is beneficial to those at the top of the
income ladder.
While the effect of inequality may be most pro-
nounced in political institutions, there is also evidence
that economic institutions can also be degraded from pro-
longed inequality. Keefer and Knack (2002) note that
social polarization is bad for property rights, showing
that inequality leads to a more interventionist govern-
ment with short time-horizons, willing to expropriate in
period 1 for increased revenues with no thought as to the
consequences in period 2 (a similar argument, noting
that less inequality leads to stronger rights, is made by
Gradstein (2007)). Likewise, in countries with a highly
stratified income distribution, broader property rights
may be opposed by richer elements of society who have
invested in their own private rights, a situation that is
found in many transition countries of the former Soviet
Union (Sonin, 2003). In this scenario, politically-earned
inequality (a common source of inequality across the
globe) creates its own further barriers to entry in the form
of weak property rights, ossifying the status quo and
reducing income mobility.
This second hypothesis thus takes into account these
facts and extends the reasoning further to note that trade
itself, a type of economic institution, will likely suffer
from inequality. In other terms, if trade may create
inequalities, and poor institutions create even more
inequality, and inequality creates poor institutions, eco-
nomic inequality can plausibly be expected to harm fur-
ther moves towards globalization. In this sense, we
would expect to see significant feedback effects not only
from institutions and inequality, as in Chong and
Gradstein (2007), but also from inequality to trade.
3 | METHODOLOGY AND DATA
In order to examine the relationships between inequality,
openness, and institutions, the identification strategy fol-
lows from the theory described above, taking into
account the high level of endogeneity inherent in the
trade/institutions/inequality nexus. In particular, as
noted in the previous section, trade shapes institutions
(Martin & Steiner, 2016), and inequality also shapes insti-
tutions, while at the same time institutions influence
inequality and vitiate the benefits of trade. To model
these effects econometrically, we use a theoretically-
motivated simultaneous equations system based on a
three-stage least squares (3SLS estimator) similar to de
Macedo, Pereira, Martins, and Jalles (2013) and Mustafa,
Rizov, and Kernohan (2017); the three simultaneous
equations utilized are derived from the literature on the
determinants of the respective dependent variable, shown
below:
3.1 | Inequality
As already noted, the main research question of this
paper is to tie in trade and institutions to inequality, a
task helped by the recent explosion in inequality-related
research (as shown in Section III). Building off of this lit-
erature review and the large number of significant
covariates noted above, the headline equation for
inequality is structured as:
INEQit = αTRADEit + βINSTITUTIONSit
+ γTRADE*INSTITUTIONSit + δX 0it + μt + ϵit,
ð1Þ
where INEQ is income inequality, TRADE is the stan-
dard measure of trade openness (exports plus imports as
a percentage of GDP), INSTITUTIONS are proxies for
specific institutions, TRADE*INSTITUTIONS is an inter-
action term between the two, X' is a vector of controls, μt
are country-specific effects, and ϵ is an error term specific
to each country-year pair.
A key issue will of course be how one measures the
dependent variable for “inequality” in Equation 1, and
for this examination we will use several metrics. The first
and most expansive one is derived from Solt (2016), who
provides the largest and most complete estimates of Gini
Indexes available today. This approach allows for a calcu-
lation of within-country income inequality, an indicator
we hope will capture the proportion of winners and
losers after globalization. Underscoring the uncertainty
which comes with obtaining a precise estimate of the
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Gini coefficient, Solt offers a hundred variables per
country-year pair; to simplify the calculations done here,
we average these estimates to obtain one Gini coefficient
per country per year (where available).
In addition, between-country inequality may also
proxy for those “left behind” by globalization, as the
increased proportion of losers may actually subsume the
winners and manifest itself in lower growth. As in many
other papers (and first explored in Sala-i-Martin, 1996),
we use the framework of sigma convergence to measure
between-country inequality, constructing a dispersion
metric equal to the standard deviation of a country's log
per capita GDP versus all other countries in that year. As
Li, Squire, and Zou (1998) note, much of variation in
inequality does not actually occur within-country, but
across countries; in this sense, seeing aggregate losses
from trade may be a better metric to understand the role
of globalization and institutions.
The headline equation of inequality shown above also
contains the key variable of interest, an interaction term
between trade openness and institutions. This variable, in
addition to the level effects of trade openness and institu-
tions in isolation on inequality, is intended to capture the
relationship between inequality and trade in the presence
of good/poor institutional structures (Hypothesis
1 above).
Finishing off the empirical exercise for this equation
will be a series of control variables, derived from the lit-
erature and following closely in line with Dabla-Norris,
Kochhar, Suphaphiphat, Ricka, and Tsounta (2015) and
Jaumotte and Osorio Buitron (2015). To avoid poten-
tially serious misspecification and overidentification
errors, the control set is kept parsimonious, but
includes: measures of national income (GDP per capita,
at its levels and squared, to capture Kuznets-type effects
as shown in inter alia De Gregorio & Lee, 2002); labour
market institutions (proxied here by the national unem-
ployment rate); democracy (on the theory that inequal-
ity is tolerated less in a democracy, measured here by
the ICRG indicator for democratic accountability); gov-
ernment spending (to capture transfer payments and the
social safety net); deviations in growth over a 5-year
window (in order to capture productivity or, more accu-
rately, the Balassa-Samuelson effect, see Caporale, Hadj
Amor, and Rault (2014); an interaction term between
productivity (the aforementioned growth deviations)
and the chosen metric of property rights2; resource
endowments (rents as percent of GDP, to capture Dutch
Disease and politically-created rents); female mortality
(as a proxy for gender inequality); and human capital
(proxied by both the initial level of secondary enrolment
and the “Human Capital Index” from the World Eco-
nomic Forum).
3.2 | Institutions
The second equation of note here determines the forces
driving the levels of institutional efficiency in a country,
in particular the levels of property rights and, to a lesser
extent, democratic accountability. While there is a large
literature on the effects of institutions on trade, inequal-
ity, and other metrics (notably growth), there are how-
ever small clues as to the determinants of institutional
levels over a shorter time-span than millennia.
Mijiyawa (2013) has laid out an impressive first attempt
to understand the determinants of property rights,
modelling rights according to several schools of thought,
derived from theoretical pieces stretching back hundreds
of years. Similarly, Barro (1999) was one of the first eco-
nomic examinations of the determinants of democracy,
finding several similarities to Mijiyawa's analysis in the
linkages between development, human capital, and
institutions.
Of direct relevance for this research question,
Mijiyawa (2013) also notes a strong and significant nega-
tive relationship between property rights and a country's
Gini coefficient, likely accounting for the use of political
(rather than market) power to acquire property, institu-
tionalizing inequality to those not politically-connected.
Similarly, in relation to democracy, it is possible that
inequality also harms democratic accountability, as the
elite seek to stifle access to political levers in order to
keep economic power for themselves (Venezuela and
Russia are excellent examples of this trend in recent
years). In this sense, economic inequality may perpetuate
political inequality, as the rule-makers write regulations
and pass laws in order to limit political competition (in a
classic example of cartel behaviour). Moreover, specific
economic policies may also be undertaken in order to sti-
fle political competition, such as loose monetary policies
(favouring those first in line to receive cash), while strong
property rights may mitigate against deterioration of
democracy.
Given this theoretical backing, the equation relating
institutions to their determinants is thus:
INSTITUTIONSit = αTRADEit + βINEQit + ρY
0
it + μt + ϵit
ð2Þ
where INSTITUTIONS is the institution in question
(property rights or democracy), TRADE and INEQ are as
shown in Equation 1 above and Y0 is a vector of controls.
Property rights are measured in this analysis by two sepa-
rate measures, one objective and one subjective: the
objective indicator is contract-intensive money (CIM),
introduced by Clague, Keefer, Knack, and Olson (1999)
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and representing the proportion of money held inside the
formal banking sector, while the subjective indicator is
the ICRG's measure of investor protection (measuring
the risk of expropriation). Each measure has some gaps
in its coverage (for CIM the gaps relate to years, while for
the ICRG indicator not all countries are covered), but
together they help to form a complete picture of property
rights. Completing the specification, the controls for the
property rights specification are derived from
Mijiyawa (2013), and include natural resource rents, lati-
tude, level of democracy, population size, financial mar-
ket development, labour market efficiency (proxied by
the unemployment rate), initial GDP per capita, initial
levels of education, and dummies for legal origin (from
the database devised by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer (2008)).
By contrast, democracy is measured by the ICRG mea-
sure of democratic accountability, coded from 1 to 6 with
higher numbers representing more democracy. For this set
of controls, as Mijiyawa (2013) and Hartwell (2014) note,
GDP growth, the presence of strong property rights, finan-
cial market development, inflation (as a proxy for mone-
tary policy), legal origin, and initial levels of education
(as a proxy for demand for democracy) may all correlate
with levels of democracy. Thus, they are included here.
3.3 | Trade openness
The final relationship in the series of equations shown
here examines the determinants of trade liberalization
(globalization) itself. Similar to the equation on institu-
tions, there is also a dearth of research in the extant liter-
ature on this topic; although gravity equations remain
the workhorse of international trade modelling on a
bilateral basis, there is less work on the determinants of
aggregate trade flows or a country's overall trade stance.
Guttmann and Richards (2006) are a notable exception,
transposing standard gravity variables (and adding addi-
tional plausible covariates) to a model of aggregate trade
flows for a large cross-section of countries (170 in total)
across six five-year periods. Their examination, once
again tracking the gravity literature, finds that country
size as proxied by both population and area are the main
determinants of trade openness, with smaller landmasses
and smaller populations trading much more extensively.
Property rights have a small but significant effect, a find-
ing which holds across specifications. In a similar vein,
Bleaney and Neaves (2013) find that size matters but has
been declining over time (they provide no estimation on
the effect of institutions on trade, however).
For this paper, the underlying trade openness equa-
tion will rely on both of these papers for its set of
covariates. But of particular interest for us is, as noted in
Hypothesis 2 above, whether or not inequality harms fur-
ther trade liberalization. This equation, the third leg of
the triangle, seeks to answer this question via the inclu-
sion of inequality as a right-hand variable, relating
inequality to the level of a country's trade openness.
Moreover, to capture the dynamic effects of inequality on
trade openness, we also include one-, five-, and ten-year
lags of the inequality metrics noted above.
TRADEit = αINSTITUTIONSit + βINEQit + τZ
0
it + μt + ϵit
ð3Þ
The controls utilized in this final equation, derived
from the aforementioned literature, posits trade openness
as a function of (in addition to inequality and property
rights), size, population, and other country-specific traits:
these will include democracy (to understand the willing-
ness of the population to open to competition); latitude
(to proxy for geography and the effect of the tropics);
whether a country is landlocked (to proxy for remote-
ness); country size (for scale effects); resource endow-
ment (resource rents as a percentage of GDP); human
capital (proxied by secondary education enrolment);
labour market efficiency; investment potential (initial
levels of schooling); government spending (which corre-
lates with higher trade openness, see Adsera &
Boix, 2002); access to finance and/or financial depth
(bank deposits to GDP, to show ability to take advantage
of trade opportunities); and the structure of the economy
(agriculture as a percentage of GDP). By restricting the
analysis to these metrics, we hope to capture the vast
majority of determinants of trade liberalization/globaliza-
tion without undue white noise. Such an approach, as
with the other equations, will also help to alleviate mis-
specification errors across the 3SLS estimation.
The data for this exercise, comprising these various
variables, was compiled from a large number of publicly
available sources, including Solt (2016), the World Bank's
World Development Indicators (WDI), the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG), the IMF's International
Financial Statistics (IFS), previous research, and many
other sources. A complete list of variables, definitions,
and sources is shown in Table 1 and summary statistics
are shown in Table 2.
4 | RESULTS
The results of the empirical exercise for both hypotheses
are shown in Tables 3 and 4. Given the space constraints
involved in showing the results of the three equations, it
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TABLE 1 Variables, definitions, sources
Variable Source Description




Author's calculations Interaction of Gini coefficient and democratic accountability
Bank deposits as % of GDP World Bank WDI Demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks as a
share of GDP
Democratic accountability ICRG Extent of responsiveness of a government to its people, rated
from 1 to 6, with higher number indicating more democracy
Female mortality World Bank WDI Female mortality rate, per 1,000 female adults, ages 15–64
French legal origin dummy La Porta et al. (2008) Dummy taking the value of 1 if a country had the specific legal
origin, 0 if otherwise
Government spending as % of
GDP
World Bank WDI All government current expenditures for purchases of goods and
services (including compensation of employees), as % of GDP
Human capital index World economic forum Assesses learning and employment outcomes across 5 distinct
age groups, on a scale from 0 (worst) to 100 (best)
Initial GDP per capita Author's calculations from World
Bank data
GDP per capita from the first year available
Initial secondary enrolment
ratio
Author's calculations from World
Bank data
Secondary enrolment ratio from the first year available
Investor protection ICRG Risk of expropriation, contract enforcement, and repatriation of
profits, scored on a scale from 0–12 with higher numbers
indicating better protection
Labour quality The conference board Contribution of labour quality to GDP growth, measure by
changes in the composition of the workforce (based on
Employment and wages by educational attainment)
Land area World Bank WDI Total land area in square kilometres
Landlocked dummy CEPII GeoDist database Dummy taking the value of 1 if a country is landlocked, 0
otherwise
Latitude CEPII GeoDist database Actual latitude of a country's capital city
Log GDP per capita World Bank WDI GDP per capita
Log GDP per capita squared World Bank WDI Quadratic term on GDP per capita
Log of population World Bank WDI Population in millions, log-linearized
Private credit as % of GDP World Bank WDI Financial resources provided to the private sector by financial
corporations, including loans, purchases of non-equity
securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable
Property rights (contract-
intensive money)
Author's calculations from IMF
international financial
statistics data
M2 less currency held outside formal banking institutions as a
percentage of M2. See also the text
Resource rents as % of GDP World Bank WDI Sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft),
mineral rents, and forest rents as % of GDP
Scandinavian legal origin
dummy
La Porta et al. (2008) Dummy taking the value of 1 if a country had the specific legal
origin, 0 if otherwise
Sigma convergence Author's calculations Country standard deviation of GDP per capita against the mean
GDP of all countries for that year




Author's calculations Interaction term of trade openness and CIM
(Continues)
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was decided to display only the “headline” equation
(i.e., Equation 1 above) expressing inequality as a func-
tion of trade openness and institutional quality.3 The first
specification, shown in Column 1 of Table 3, looks at the
effects of property rights on inequality, with property





Author's calculations Interaction of trade openness and democratic accountability
Trade*investor protection Author's calculations Interaction term of trade openness and investor protection
UK legal origin dummy La Porta et al. (2008) Dummy taking the value of 1 if a country had the specific legal
origin, 0 if otherwise
Unemployment rate International labour office Number of unemployed persons as a percentage of the total
number of persons in the labour force
TABLE 2 Summary statistics
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Average Gini coefficient 4,281 0.382 0.089 0.198 0.609
Average Gini coefficient*democracy 2,800 1.592 0.560 0.000 3.405
Bank deposits as % of GDP 7,605 37.980 37.833 0.000 479.670
Democratic accountability 4,242 3.787 1.666 0.000 6.000
Female mortality, 15–64 years 10,286 197.739 123.834 31.589 799.382
French legal origin dummy 10,864 0.505 0.500 0.000 1.000
Government spending as % of GDP 7,783 15.926 7.605 0.000 156.532
Human capital index 6,065 2.102 0.722 1.007 3.734
Initial GDP per capita 10,864 6.318 1.417 3.703 10.316
Initial secondary enrolment ratio 10,360 40.842 30.727 0.000 98.983
Investor protection 3,678 7.404 2.524 0.000 12.000
Land area (in sq. km) 10,445 680,129 1,854,781 20 16,400,000
Landlocked dummy 10,864 0.180 0.385 0.000 1.000
Latitude 10,528 18.680 24.184 −44.283 64.150
Log GDP per capita 8,584 7.480 1.685 3.548 11.688
Log GDP per capita squared 8,584 58.794 26.005 12.588 136.617
Log of population 10,827 15.158 2.120 9.174 21.039
Private credit as % of GDP 7,517 35.642 33.256 0.001 312.118
Property rights (contract-intensive money) 2,862 0.816 0.148 0.139 1.000
Resource rents as % of GDP 7,480 7.136 11.170 0.000 89.166
Scandinavian legal origin dummy 10,864 0.031 0.173 0.000 1.000
Sigma convergence 8,584 0.180 0.122 0.000 1.557
Standard deviation of growth, 5-year window 7,562 0.106 0.082 . 0.003 0.855
Trade openness as % of GDP 8,120 79.290 54.584 0.000 860.800
Trade*contract-intensive money 2,781 71.675 50.811 6.565 441.212
Trade*democratic accountability 4,006 317.560 262.717 0.000 2,628.941
Trade*investor protection 3,501 628.279 542.664 0.000 5,299.246
UK legal origin dummy 10,864 0.340 0.474 0.000 1.000
Unemployment rate 4,500 9.048 6.338 0.100 37.600
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TABLE 3 Results of baseline regressions
Average Gini coefficient
1 2 3 4
Trade openness 0.02 −0.002 0.01 −0.0003
4.79*** 1.67* 4.34*** 0.27
INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES
Property rights (contract-intensive money) 2.11 1.18
5.30*** 4.72***
Property rights (investor protection) 0.04 0.03
1.43 1.19
Democratic accountability −0.03 −0.01 0.00 −0.03
6.36*** 1.62 1.04 2.27**
Contract-intensive money*trade openness −0.02 −0.010
4.73*** 3.94***
Investor protection*trade openness 0.001 −0.0001
0.74 1.09
Democratic accountability*trade openness −0.0003 0.0003
5.48*** 2.29**
CONTROLS
GDP per capita 0.15 0.20 0.14 0.18
4.34*** 11.08*** 7.09*** 10.39***
GDP per capita 2̂ −0.01 −0.01 −0.008 −0.01
4.80*** 11.52*** 7.32*** 10.62***
Productivity 1.04 1.32 0.6100 0.49
2.25** 1.74* 2.15** 1.12
Productivity*property rights −1.20 −0.17 −0.70 −0.06
2.15** 1.72* 2.04** 1.12
Resources to GDP −0.001 −0.0040 0.0002 0.0003
2.36** 0.98 0.07 0.51
Unemployment 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003
5.13*** 5.66*** 8.24*** 7.49***
Initial secondary enrollment −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002
5.69*** 9.01*** 8.24*** 10.09***
Female mortality 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
2.98*** 3.67*** 3.04*** 5.32***
Population −0.01 −0.002 −0.0020 0.00
3.44*** 0.95 1.10 0.70
Human capital index −0.03 0.03 −0.01 0.040
3.01*** 2.76*** 1.07 3.61***
Government spending −0.005 −0.002 −0.004 −0.004
5.33*** 2.50** 7.73*** 5.70***
C −1.52 −0.55 −1.08 −0.44
4.57*** 3.68*** 5.21*** 3.56***
n 1,091 1905 906 1,569
R-squared 0.11 0.05 0.49 0.52
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in italics, *, **, and *** denoting significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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TABLE 4 Results of sigma convergence regressions
Sigma convergence
1 2 3 4
Trade openness −0.010 −0.003 −0.010 −0.003
4.52*** 2.06** 5.33*** 2.94***
INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES
Property rights (contract-intensive money) −1.21 −1.18
5.96*** 5.92***
Property rights (investor protection) −0.07 −0.04
1.91* 2.57***
Democratic accountability 0.006 0.01 −0.01 0.010
2.76*** 3.48*** 2.44** 1.15
Contract-intensive money*trade openness 0.01 0.01
4.56*** 5.20***
Investor protection*trade openness 0.0003 0.0003
2.14** 3.10***
Democratic accountability*trade openness 0.0002 −0.00002
4.40*** 0.17
CONTROLS
GDP per capita −0.57 −0.51 −0.57 −0.51
19.74*** 28.68*** 20.17*** 27.57***
GDP per capita 2̂ 0.03 0.03 0.030 0.03
20.39*** 28.50*** 20.14*** 26.09***
Productivity −0.78 −1.73 −0.7100 −0.6200
3.04*** 1.56 2.60*** 2.04**
Productivity*property rights 0.79 0.21 0.7300 0.0700
2.49** 1.46 2.15** 1.69*
Resources to GDP −0.001 0.0010 −0.0002 0.002
1.56 2.12** 0.50 2.39**
Unemployment −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004
6.02*** 6.49*** 6.21*** 6.56***
Initial secondary enrollment 0.0010 0.0010 0.001 0.001
6.13*** 6.72*** 6.07*** 6.58***
Female mortality 0.00010 0.00060 0.0007 0.00004
2.81*** 2.27** 1.91* 1.85*
Population −0.0009 −0.002 −0.002 −0.01
0.39 0.71 0.75 3.44***
Human capital index −0.02 0.00 −0.01 −0.007
1.65* 0.32 1.05 0.64
Government spending 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
4.10*** 3.97*** 3.87*** 4.25***
C 3.44 2.66 3.48 2.57
18.87*** 13.81*** 19.50*** 25.65***
n 906 1,569 906 1,569
R-squared 0.58 0.50 0.57 0.68
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in italics, *, **, and *** denoting significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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proxied by Gini dispersion. The first thing that jumps out
immediately is that, across our dataset, it appears that both
property rights and trade openness have a statistically sig-
nificant and positive association with income inequality.
However, as predicted by our theory, property rights and
trade openness interacted together do have a mitigating
effect (albeit the scale is not as large as the inequality
predicted by strong property rights).
TABLE 5 Granger-causality tests
(a) Common coefficient test
Null hypothesis Lags Obs F-statistic Prob.
Income inequality does not Granger cause trade
openness
4 2.02025 0.089*
Trade openness does not Granger cause income
inequality
3,485 2.87139 0.022**
Income inequality (−5 years) does not Granger cause
trade openness
4 3,132 3.55478 0.007***
Trade openness does not Granger cause income
inequality (−5 years)
0.83373 0.504
Income inequality (−10 years) does not Granger cause
trade openness
4 2,549 4.00152 0.003***
Trade openness does not Granger cause income
inequality (−10 years)
0.04032 0.997
(b) Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) individual coefficient test
Null hypothesis Lags W-stat Z-bar tilde Prob.
1960–1990
Income inequality does not Granger cause trade openness 2 3.968 2.414 0.02**
Trade openness does not Granger cause income inequality 7.751 3.101 0.002***
Income inequality (−5 years) does not Granger cause trade openness 1 3.25 1.81 0.07*
Trade openness does not Granger cause income inequality (−5 years) 0.65 −0.89 0.373
1990–2015
Income inequality does not Granger cause trade openness 1 2.663 2.43 0.02**
Trade openness does not Granger cause income inequality 1.922 1.005 0.315
Income inequality (−5 years) does not Granger cause trade openness 1 2.461 2.04 0.04**
Trade openness does not Granger cause income inequality (−5 years) 2.439 2.00 0.05**
Income inequality (−10 years) does not Granger cause trade openness 1 2.729 2.556 0.01***
Trade openness does not Granger cause income inequality (−10 years) 2.10 1.345 0.179
1990–2005
Income inequality does not Granger cause trade openness 1 2.85 4.7603 0.000***
Trade openness does not Granger cause income inequality 3.252 6.064 0.000***
Income inequality (−5 years) does not Granger cause trade openness 1 3.06 5.439 0.000***
Trade openness does not Granger cause income inequality (−5 years) 2.38 3.212 0.001***
2000–2015
Income inequality does not Granger cause trade openness 1 2.4852 2.3255 0.02**
Trade openness does not Granger cause income inequality 2.0306 1.3512 0.177
Income inequality (−5 years) does not Granger cause trade openness 1 2.5724 2.5122 0.01***
Trade openness does not Granger cause income inequality (−5 years) 2.1299 1.564 0.118
Note: (A) Lags chosen on the basis of an unrestricted VAR with minimized information criteria. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels respectively. (B) Lags chosen on the basis of Akaike information criteria. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively.
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Swapping out the CIM indicator with the ICRG
investment profile to capture property rights is done in
the model shown in Column 2, and the change in vari-
able results in a much larger number of observations but
much weaker results. In particular, the relationship
between trade openness and inequality is weakly nega-
tive, while property rights show a slightly positive but
insignificant correlation with inequality (and the interac-
tion between the two is also insignificant). Part of the rea-
son behind this change can be attributed to what the two
metrics of property rights are measuring: as Hart-
well (2017) notes, the ICRG measure can be thought of as
a measure of potential property rights, encompassing leg-
islation and the like, while contract-intensive money is a
metric of realized property rights, including enforcement
and expectations. In this sense, what our two sets of
results are thus capturing are two different effects, the
effect of well-written property rights legislation on
inequality and the effect of well-enforced rights on the
same. Seen in this light, legislation has little effect on
inequality, while good contractual enforcement, by
protecting rights, can lead to higher inequality through
market-based rewards. Future research calls for a way to
involve state capacity in this equation.
Turning to the effects of democracy on inequality in
the face of globalization, democracy was already included
in the first two base specifications on property rights, and
in both it showed a dampening effect on inequality
(as predicted by theory). Including the interaction term
between openness and democracy in Columns 3 and
4 (replicating the earlier regressions with two separate
proxies for property rights), we see that the influence of
democracy turns insignificant by itself in Column 3, but
that there is a negative effect on inequality in the face of
trade openness and more democracy. On the other hand,
using the legislative measure for property rights in Col-
umn 4, democracy appears to continue to have a negative
effect on inequality at the 5% level of significance, but in
the face of trade openness, it has a marginally positive
effect on inequality (with property rights and trade hav-
ing no effect). This result holds subject to a series of
robustness tests (not shown here), including interacting
democracy with an executive constraints measure, to see
if executive discretion is driving the results, and using an
alternate measure of democracy (the polity2 measure
from the Polity IV database). Given the radically different
number of observations in this specification, as well as
issues encountered when including the population and
resource measures (which were dropped here), these
results must be treated with caution.
As noted earlier, the use of the Gini coefficient as a
measure of income inequality may be subject to its own
issues, as noted by Li et al. (1998), so a metric of
between-country inequality should also be utilized to
capture net losses attributable to globalization. This
sigma convergence measure, a simple dispersion of stan-
dard deviations, would theoretically improve under glob-
alization, as factor prices and competition spread the
benefits of trade; also, theoretically, the only sticking
point to such an adjustment could be the presence of
poor institutions not allowing the benefits of trade to
accrue.
Table 4 shows the results of using sigma convergence
as a dependent variable, and the effect of institutions on
this outcome. Trade openness by itself appears to
unequivocally reduce between-country inequality, with
the same economic significance across specifications.
With regard to property rights, it appears that it too has a
strong negative association with between-country
inequality no matter which metric of rights is used
(in distinction to within-country inequality). Interacting
property rights and trade openness, however, also returns
a consistent result, and that is a divergence in incomes
across countries. Given the structure of this analysis, we
cannot say which portion of the income distribution is
driving these results, but a plausible explanation is that
property rights help to make poorer countries richer
(decreasing inequality); on the other hand, property
rights and trade openness help to make richer countries
even richer, increasing inequality.
Turning to the effects of democracy (Columns 3 and
4 of Table 4), they also have somewhat surprising results,
in that democracy taken alone has very little effect, but
democracy interacted with trade openness appears to
slightly widen inequality when using contract-intensive
money as a proxy for property rights. Including investor
protection and legislative guarantees of property rights,
democracy appears to have little correlation with
between-country inequality, failing to be significant in
the specification shown in Column 4. Property rights
continue to behave as earlier.
For the final question, on whether or not inequality
can force a slowdown of trade liberalization, there are
several approaches we may utilize to examine this ques-
tion empirically. The first, and most simple, is the con-
cept of Granger-causality (Granger, 1969) which,
different from pure causality in the non-economic sense,
can enlighten us to the movements of economic statistics
and their relations to each other. With lag lengths
selected via an unrestricted VAR and where the majority
of information criteria was minimized, the results of a
common coefficient Granger-causality test are shown in
Table 5, panel A. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is two-
way Granger-causality between trade openness and
income inequality taken in the same year (Granger-
causality tests the null of no causality; a rejection of the
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TABLE 6 Is trade openness affected by inequality?
Trade openness
1 2 3 4 5 6
Average Gini coefficient 485.65 405.91
6.08*** 5.96***
Gini 5-year lag 91.15 122.35
3.92*** 4.94***
Gini 10-year lag 47.83 107.75
1.67* 5.20***
INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES
Property rights (contract-intensive money) −60.09 97.83 160.08
1.36 2.04** 3.41***
Property rights (investor protection) 8.77 9.81 8.96
4.00*** 5.10*** 4.27***
Democratic accountability 2.23 −1.05 −2.50 −2.43 −4.00 −2.92
1.41 0.90 1.70* 2.39** 2.55*** 2.96***
CONTROLS
Initial GDP per capita 9.40 7.36 6.86 7.60 4.81 7.63
5.25*** 5.47*** 4.13*** 5.22*** 2.84*** 5.51***
Productivity 222.23 351.08 367.6300 252.59 516.23 320.24
1.43 4.24*** 1.91* 5.15*** 2.86*** 4.00***
Productivity*property rights −330.08 −45.01 −478.4700 −45.08 −650.00 −29.50
1.60 4.18*** 1.96* 5.14*** 2.89*** 3.81***
Resources to GDP 1.18 1.08 0.97 0.94 0.75 0.74
4.81*** 4.57*** 4.84*** 4.77*** 3.55*** 4.29***
Unemployment −2.62 −1.35 −0.49 −0.11 −0.40 −0.22
5.09*** 3.88*** 1.93* 0.52 1.39 1.05
Initial secondary enrollment 0.31 0.17 −0.01 −0.20 0.07 −0.21
2.35** 1.42 0.16 2.59*** 0.94 2.63***
Land area −0.00004 −0.00006 −0.00005 −0.00006 −0.00005 −0.00005
8.49*** 10.59*** 10.83*** 12.48*** 10.62*** 11.58***
Landlocked 19.59 13.33 14.05 12.71 14.11 13.36
5.60*** 5.15*** 4.52*** 5.20*** 4.39*** 5.65***
Latitude 0.43 0.39 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.30
7.75*** 6.20*** 9.40*** 8.90*** 10.68*** 9.56***
Government spending 2.64 2.14 1.12 0.88 0.72 0.85
7.30*** 5.88*** 3.68*** 4.19*** 2.18** 3.67***
Bank deposits 0.28 0.44 0.12 0.43 0.02 0.41
4.39*** 9.49*** 1.78* 9.50*** 0.34 9.52***
C −180.53 −253.80 −95.07 −116.46 −105.23 −101.62
4.61*** 6.70*** 3.47*** 6.91*** 4.10*** 6.34***
n 906 1,569 873 1,499 812 1,375
R-squared 0.02 0.22 0.26 0.37 0.27 0.54
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in italics, *, **, and *** denoting significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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null implies that X Granger-causes Y). But as we use
deeper lags, going back to Gini coefficients from five and
ten years previously, we see that the causality is unidirec-
tional, running exclusively from income inequality to
trade policies and not the other way around.
As a check on this examination, given the heterogene-
ity of our dataset, it is plausible that each individual
country may have its own version of Granger causality,
and thus we also utilize the Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012)
test for panel data. The Dumitrescu and Hurlin test
allows coefficients to differ across individuals, using an
average of Wald statistics from country-specific regres-
sions to test the null that there is no Granger-causality
between the ordered variables; as Lopez and Weber (2017)
note, the results show how there can be causality for
some individuals but not necessarily for all.
Given that the routines for this test across all statisti-
cal packages require strongly balanced data—and our
dataset is definitely unbalanced—the test has been con-
ducted on various subsets of the data which are balanced
over various time periods.4 The results of this are shown
in Table 5, panel B, and, despite which sub-set of the
entire panel is utilized, the results from the common
coefficient tests hold, namely that income inequality
influences trade openness but not necessarily the other
way around. For the longest balanced panel we were able
to utilize (from 1990 to 2015), the results are sharpest and
also allow for the inclusion of the ten-year lag of inequal-
ity; while inequality and trade openness appear to inter-
act even at a five year lag, by the tenth year, it is
inequality which is exerting influence on trade openness
and not vice versa.5 Again, while this is not true causality
in the accepted sense of the word, both of these tests
show that past values of income inequality contain infor-
mation that help to predict the level of trade openness
above and beyond the information contained in a coun-
try's previous experience with trade openness.
Moving back into a multivariate framework, we may
better understand the relationship between the two fac-
tors via the constituent equations of the previous analyses
below the headlines, using trade openness as the depen-
dent variable and inequality as an independent variable.
These results are shown in Table 6, Columns 1 and
2, and the results are somewhat surprising—across the
two headline specifications, high inequality correlated
with trade openness in a statistically and economically
significant manner (while the effects of property seem to
be mostly positive and that of democracy small but gener-
ally negative). Perhaps these results need to be taken
with a note of caution: as these numbers are capturing
TABLE 7 Trade openness and inequality redux
Dependent variable: Trade openness
1 2 3 4 5 6
Average Gini coefficient 1969.58 621.34 1,085.09 265.82 1969.58 621.34
4.35*** 3.56*** 3.76*** 1.09 4.98*** 2.74***
Gini coefficient*democracy −354.67 −97.73
4.19*** 2.85***
Gini 5-year lag* democracy −162.59 −19.18
3.41*** 0.48
Gini 10-year lag*democracy −354.67 −97.74
4.80*** 2.34**
INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES
Property rights (contract-intensive money) −301.91 −145.52 −201.91
2.56*** 1.73* 2.12**
Property rights (investor protection) 8.83 8.87 8.83
4.48*** 3.47*** 3.72***
Democratic accountability 146.30 37.69 67.41 5.67 146.30 37.69
4.11*** 2.63*** 3.27*** 0.34 4.68*** 2.07**
Controls? YES YES YES YES YES YES
n 906 1,569 884 1,499 906 1,569
R-squared 0.27 0.34 0.47 0.36 0.27 0.34
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in italics, *, **, and *** denoting significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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simultaneous effects, there could be other prior factors
driving the results apart from the corrected-for endo-
geneity. Given the simultaneous nature of the system,
much as was done with the Granger-causality tests, we
also include lags of up to 10 years for the Gini coefficient,
trying to see if previous income disparities in an economy
could have generated. Unfortunately for this hypothesis,
while the scale of the effect does decay, there is no evi-
dence (Columns 3 through 6) that inequality leads to
changes in globalization or behaviour in trade policy.
Much as in the baseline specification, inequality, even at
deeper lags, continues to be associated with much higher
levels of trade openness.
Finally, there is a chance that these specifications are
missing something important, namely that income
inequality by itself has little effect on trade openness
without a method for expressing dissatisfaction, that is,
the democratic process. For this final check, we re-run
the original and the augmented regressions including an
interaction term between the Gini coefficient of a particu-
lar year (simultaneous and at 5 and 10-year lags) and
democracy. The results, shown in Table 7, confirm this
hypothesis, as the interaction between democracy and
inequality has a significant and largely negative effect on
a country's trade openness (the outsize coefficients are
based on an increase in the Gini coefficient of one, which
is of course the largest amount any country's Gini can
increase; thus, partial increases in equality as captured in
percentage change in the Gini will lead to much lower
effects than are seen here). These results show that, while
democracy may encourage trade openness in general and
inequality may be correlated with trade, prolonged
inequality is detrimental in the long run for globalization.
Succinctly stated, too many losers from trade, given a
choice at the ballot box, may indeed agitate for less trade
in the long term.
5 | CONCLUSIONS
This paper has taken a new look at the question of trade
winners and losers by examining the nexus between
trade openness, institutions, and income inequality. The
results, while sensitive to choices of institutional metrics
and calling for much deeper research, show that institu-
tions can indeed mitigate trade-induced losses, even as
they provide the needed signals for the reallocation of
resources in an economy. Furthermore, while prolonged
inequality is no guarantee of protectionist policies, con-
tinued losses from the dislocations accompanying trade
in a democracy can indeed provide a brake on further
globalization.
From a policy standpoint, the recommendations appear
to be rather self-evident, as it would behove a country to
ensure its fundamental institutions are sound in order to
reap the full benefits of globalization. As theory would pre-
dict, there is necessarily an element of inequality that
comes from trade, with winners and losers always present,
as trade is not an equilibrium concept: moving goods, ser-
vices, and payments around the world implies a search for
greater consumer and producer surplus, and thus the dislo-
cations of that chase will always be present. Given this real-
ity, good institutions may actually help to exacerbate this
inequality in the short-term via a reallocation of incentives
as well as resources. However, as the analysis above has
shown, good institutions may help such disruption to be
short-lived and mitigate the necessary dislocation of global-
ization, meaning that trade dislocation is always present
but is relatively far less painful than it could be in an envi-
ronment of greater distortions. Thus, ensuring that prop-
erty rights and democratic accountability are respected,
protected, and inviolable should be a priority for any gov-
ernment facing globalization.
It is also self-evident, from a political economy per-
spective, that such a recommendation is easier said than
done. For many countries, especially Latin American
ones which have undergone abrupt gyrations in their
institutional environments, the legacy of “bad” institu-
tions may persist even long after “good” institutions are
in place (moreover, there may be additional confounding
variables related to culture and informal institutions
which can counteract formal institutions). Political order-
ings, types of democracy (Acemoglu, Egorov, &
Sonin, 2010), and even the precise combination of institu-
tions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006) can all have an
impact, and the face that institutions are semi-permanent
may mean that their influence persists long beyond their
formal abandonment. However, Harberger (1998:21)
noted that “Releasing [an] economy from its trammels,
correcting an accumulation of past mistakes, can some-
times set in motion a prolonged episode of astounding
growth”. In this sense, the concept of the “second best”
in trade distortions may also apply, as any move towards
better institutions would obviously be more welfare-
improving than remaining in a downward spiral.
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1 Despite this result, Reuveny and Li do not include an interaction
term for openness and democracy, as we do here.
2 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting both the inclusion
of the Balassa-Samuelson effect and the interaction term.
3 Additional results in the system of equations are available from
the author upon request.
4 The test is run on Stata 15 using the command xtgcause, with lag
length chosen by the usual information criteria (AIC, BIC) and
with bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 repetitions performed).
5 The Dumitrescu and Hurlin test requires a T of at least 8 per
panel to run, and in the forced balanced database, many panels
did not have both the capacity for a 10-year lag of the inequality
metric and a series of at least eight observations. Thus, the only
sub-set where this was feasible was the 1990–2015 set.
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